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Comment and Casenotes
IMPUTING PARENTAL NEGLIGENCE TO
BAR RECOVERY BY AN INFANT
By

SAm EL

D. HILL*

Before the courts today are numerous cases involving
injury to infants of tender years alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of another in the maintenance of
his property or the operation of his vehicle. In each case
of this nature before courts in Maryland a doctrine of law,
which has been called "barbaric",' stands menacing the
right of the infant to recover. It has been approved as late
as 1951 by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.2 The doctrine
involves the imputing of negligence of the parent or custodian to one who is too young to be guilty of negligence
himself and thus barring recovery by the infant for his
injuries.
In 1839 the Court of Appeals of New York first rationalized this theory.' However, the doctrine had hardly been
initiated before most courts found it undesirable and refused to apply it. In other courts its popularity was short
lived and its applicability was soon overruled.' Two states,
including New York, where it got its start, have precluded
the applicability of the doctrine by statute.' An investigation of authorities, both decisions and text, reveals that
thirty-nine states have now rejected or overruled the doctrine of imputing parental negligence to a child of tender
years.' The Restatement of Torts expressly rejects the
* Of the Baltimore Bar; A.B., 1950, Princeton University, LL.B., 1954,
University of Maryland.
1 Caraveo v. Pickwick Stages System, 113 Cal. App. 443, 298 P. 516, 517
(1931). See also quote from PROSSER ON TORTS (1941), 420, infra, n. 10,
characterizing the doctrine as "barbarous".
Graham v. Western Md. Dairy, 198 Md. 210, 214, 81 A. 2d 457 (1951).
8
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 615 (1839).
PROSSER, op. cit., supra, n. 1, 419-420.
5
Ann. Laws Mass. C. 231, Sec. 85D (1954 Cum. Supp.) ; New York Cons.
Laws -Service, Domestic Relations Law, Sec. 73.
o 15 A. L. R. 414 lists 34 jurisdictions where the doctrine is inapplicable.
In addition to those states cases were found in Oregon, Arizona and New
Mexico rejecting the doctrine and the statutes mentioned, supra, n. 5, preclude its application in New York and Massachusetts.
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doctrine.7 Three states have recently upheld its validity,8
and one state has hinted that it might apply.'
Prosser says of the doctrine that:
"It is a barbarous rule which denies the innocent
victim of the negligence of two persons redress against
either, and visits the sins of the fathers upon their
children, and the overruling weight of authority now
rejects it."'"
American Jurisprudence clearly states the reasoning of
those states which now refuse to apply the doctrine to be:
"...;
that he (the infant) is entitled to the protection of the law equally with persons who have attained
their majority, and to refuse him relief on the ground
of his parents' indifference or negligence would be to
deny it to him; and that to impute to him negligence
of others is harsh in the extreme, whether the negligence so imputed is that of his parents, their servants,
or his guardian.""
Yet among those three states which still recognize the
imputation of the custodian's negligence to bar recovery
by an infant of tender years is Maryland. The doctrine was
first recognized by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1866
in the case of Bannon v. B. & 0. R.R. Co.12 Since that time
a number of decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals
have reiterated the applicability of the doctrine under the
proper factual circumstances, 3 the most recent being
Graham v. Western Maryland Dairy.1"
The doctrine arises out of an attempt to balance the
rights and duties of the infant and the person with whose
property he comes into contact. The concept of negligence
cases embraces reciprocal rights and duties of the persons
involved. The courts recognized, however, that an infant
Sec. 488.
Maryland: Graham v. Western Md. Dairy, 8upra, n. 2; Maine: Wood v.
Balzano, 137 Me. 87, 15 A. 2d 188 (1948) ; Delaware: Messick v. Delaware
Electric Power Co., 175 A. 772 (Del. 1934).
0 Milliken v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 71 R. I. 312, 44 A. 2d 723
(1945).
10Paossnm, Zoo. cit., supra, n. 1.
"138 Am. Jur. 928, Negligence, Sec. 240. Parenthetical material added.
124 Md. 108, 125 (1868), by a reference to Hartfield v. Roper, supra, n. 3.
McMahon v. N. C. R.R. Co., 39 Md. 438 (1874) ; Balt. City Pass. Co. v.
McDonnell, 43 Md. 534 (1876) ; Cumberland v. Lottlg, 95 Md. 42, 51 A. 841
(1902) ; United Rys. Co. v. Carneal, 110 Md. 211, 72 A. 771 (1909) ; Caroline
County v. Beulah, 153 Md. 221, 138 A. 25 (1927) ; York Ice Machinery Co.
v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 173 A. 240 (1934).
11198 Md. 210, 81 A. 457 (1951).
8
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of tender years could not be expected to exercise such,
if any, care for his own safety as was required to keep the
rights and duties in balance. Therefore, the courts attempted to cast the negligence aspect, where a young infant
was injured, in proper balance by imputing to the infant
the duty of the parent or custodian to use reasonable care
in his custodial undertaking."5
This attempt to analyze the reasoning behind the application of this doctrine brings into focus the factual requirements which must be presented by the evidence and
found by the trier of fact before the theory can apply to
preclude recovery. Because of the numerous personal injury cases on our dockets involving infants of tender years
and also because of the possible misuse of this doctrine, it
seems appropriate to consider in more detail these factual
requirements.
As a matter of caution it should be noted that the doctrine applies only to cases where an infant through his
next friend is seeking to recover for personal injuries
suffered by the infant as distinguished from cases where a
parent or guardian is seeking recovery for injuries to the
infant. In the latter case any custodial negligence contributing to the infant's injuries would directly bar recovery by the parent or guardian. 6
Perhaps an examination of the rule as restated by a
later New York case, 17 will serve to best expose the elements of proof necessary to the use of the doctrine under
consideration:
"We understand the rule to be that, in an action for
an injury founded on negligence, contributory personal negligence cannot be attributed to a child of
very tender years, who from his age cannot be supposed capable of exercising judgment or discretion,
although the injury would not have happened without
his concurring act, and although that act, if committed
by an adult would be a negligent one. In such a case,
a defendant whose negligence was a constitutent element of the transaction, and without which the injury
1I SHEARMAN AND REDrIELD, NEGLIGENCE (1914), Sec. 89; Bannon v.
B. & 0. R.R. Co., supra, n. 12, 125.
16 For cases where the action was brought by the parent and his custodial
negligence was considered as a bar to recovery see: B. & 0. R.R. Co. v.
State, use of Fryer, 30 Md. 47 (1869) ;Coughlan v. B. & 0. R.R.Co., 24 Md.
84 (1866); Zipus v. United Rys. & El. Co., 135 Md. 297, 108 A. 884 (1919);
Wash. B. & A. Elec. R. Co. v. State, use of Kolish, 153 Md. 119, 137 A. 484
(1927).
11Kunz v. City of Troy, 104 N. Y. 344, 10 N. E. 442, 444 (1887).
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would not have happened, is legally responsible, notwithstanding the negligence of the infant, unless it
appears that the parents or guardians were negligent
in permitting the child to be brought into the situation
which subjected it to the hazard and resulting injury."
This theory is more succinctly presented in the statement of the minority view in the annotation in A. L. R. concerning the doctrine:
"In several jurisdictions the view is taken that the
negligence of the parent or custodian contributing to
the injury of a child should be imputed to it as to bar
a recovery by or in behalf of the child, if the child
itself is not capable of exercising the ordinary care of
an adult and its conduct does not conform to the
standard of care which an adult would be bound to
exercise. '
In these statements of the doctrine the factual requirements for its application clearly appear. The infant must
be of such tender years as not to be able to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. His action which placed him
in the place of danger must have contributed to his injury
and must have been an act which would have been negligent if performed by an adult. And there must have been
negligence on the part of the parent or custodian in performing the custodial duty which contributed to the happening of the contact causing injury to the infant. These
factual requirements are interrelated and must all appear
before this doctrine can be applied.
It is axiomatic that a young child cannot be held to the
same degree of care as should be exercised by an adult
but only to that degree of care that an infant of like age
and intelligence would use under similar circumstances. 19
Imputed parental negligence can apply only when the child
is of such tender years as to be unable to exercise care or
discretion to avoid injury. Whether a child is of such a
tender age is generally a question for the jury.2" However,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recently reiterated
that a child of four or less cannot be guilty of contributory
negligence under any circumstances.2 ' If the trier of fact
finds the child of such a young age as to be incapable of
1815 A. L. R. 414, 423.

' 9 Zulver v. Roberts, 162 Md. 636, 641, 161 A. 9 (1932) ; Miller v. Graff,
196 Md. 609, 619-20, 78 A. 2d 220 (1951).
10Zulver v. Roberts, ibid.
Miller v. Graff, supra, n. 19, 620.
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contributory negligence or the child is four years old or
younger, the first requirement in applying the doctrine
has been met.
Even though the infant be found too young to exercise
discretion for his safety, his action in getting himself into
a dangerous situation resulting in his injury must have
contributed to the happening of the injury and must have
been such an act as would constitute negligence on the part
of an adult.2 This is so regardless of the custodial negligence of the parent. For example; the doctrine could not
apply though a parent be found negligent in allowing a
very young child to cross a main thoroughfare alone, if
the child crossed at a pedestrian's crosswalk with a green
light in a manner which would not be negligent for an
adult and the child was struck by a vehicle unlawfully
crossing the intersection on a red light.
In one case the Maryland Court of Appeals has ignored
this requirement and perhaps made bad law.2" There the
infant was a six month old baby lying on its mother's lap
in an automobile driven by the father which struck a tree
which had fallen across the road. The Court found error
in the trial court's refusal to grant an instruction that the
negligence of the father could be imputed to the child. 4
The child was too young to act in any way, and especially
in a way which would be negligent for an adult. Her
father's negligence, however, was held to bar her recovery.
And yet the negligence of a driver ordinarily cannot be
imputed to another riding in his car, even if that other be
the driver's wife.2 5
By the decision in the Beulah case the rationale of the
doctrine is subverted in cases where the infant is riding in
a car with its parent. The doctrine in such a case does not
balance the duties of the defendant and the plaintiff. Even
though an adult guest in an automobile can recover, regardless of the negligence of the driver, where another's negligence is found to have contributed to the injury, a child
too young to care for itself cannot recover, if the parent
driving the automobile is found negligent. The Massachusetts Court, before the doctrine was overruled in that state
by statute, made a rather inept observation in a decision
similar to the Beulah decision that the child, since in actual
2 See the statement of the doctrine in the quote from Kunz v. City of Troy,
supra,
n. 17, and from 15 A. L. R. 414, supra, n. 18.
2
8Caroline County v. Beulah, 153 Md. 221, 138 A. 25 (1927).
Ibid, 227.
2 Sklar v. Southcomb, 194 Md. 626, 630, 72 A. 2d 11 (1950) ; Pennsylvania
R.R. Co. v. State, 188 Md. 646, 655, 53 A. 2d 526 (1947).
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physical custody of the father, was identified with him as
far as negligence was concerned. 6
The final interrelated requirement necessary for the
application of imputed parental negligence is the negligence of the parent or guardian which contributed to the
happening of the injury to the child. It is this custodial
negligence which is imputed to the child to bar recovery.
It takes the place of the contributory negligence of the
child, which cannot be found because of the child's age.
Since this negligence becomes by the doctrine the contributory negligence of the infant, it must have contributed
causally to the injury. Also the doctrine can apply only
when the person in actual custody of the child at the time
was negligent.
The custodial negligence of the parent is generally a
question for the jury.2" In determining whether there was
any custodial negligence contributing to the child's injury,
the trier of fact should consider all the circumstances.29
Certain parents have far greater means of protecting their
young children from danger than do others. The financial
means, the available play areas, the proximity to places of
danger, and many other factors should be considered.
The classic example is in the Kolish case, 0 where the
family lived in a crowded in-town block fronting on a street
along which ran the defendant's trolley. The street was
the playground. The mother was sitting on the front steps
with the little boy when her baby cried in the house. She
went to check on the baby and, upon returning to the steps
within a very short time, found that her little boy had
gotten into the street and had been killed by one of the
defendant's trolleys. Judge Sloan for the Court of Appeals
found proper the refusal to grant a directed verdict on the
negligence of the mother and also the refusal to grant a
prayer which in effect directed the jury to find a verdict
for the Defendant, if they found the mother negligent in
allowing the child to go into the roadway. 1 This prayer
according to the Court "is faulty in that it assumes failure
on the part of the mother to protect her child without
taking into account all the circumstances shown by the
Gallagher v. Johnson, 237 Mass. 455, 130 N. E. 174 (1921).
OThis does not mean in physical control but merely having the actual
custodial responsibility at the time. The person in such custody might be
the parent, an older sister or brother or, perhaps, a maid.
Wash. B. & A. R. Co. v. State, use of Kolish, 153 Md. 119, 125, 137 A.
484 (1927).
Ibid, 127.
90Ibid.
Ibid, 123-127.
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evidence".2 The Kolish case actually was brought by the
parents to recover for the child's death but the same considerations for determining the parent's negligence would
apply in a case brought by the infant to recover for his
injuries.
Upon findings of these interrelated requirements the
doctrine of imputed parental negligence can be applied to
bar recovery by the injured infant. It should be remembered that even though these factual requirements are
found, recovery by the infant cannot be barred if the defendant could have avoided the consequences of the imputable3
parental negligence by the exercise of reasonable care.
"Last clear chance" if found will remove the bar of the
parent's imputed contributory negligence just as it will
where contributory negligence of the plaintiff is found.
The determination of whether these requirements have
been met is generally for the trier of fact.3 4 In only one
case has the Court of Appeals of Maryland declared the
doctrine applicable as a matter of law.15 In that case the
mother took her child of six onto a roof near wires which
she knew were dangerous and he was injured in touching
one of those wires. The Court found as a matter of law that,
if the son was old enough to know better, he was contributorily negligent in touching the wires and, if he was too
young to exercise discretion, his mother's negligence in
taking him into such a dangerous place would be imputed
to him. 6
This decision later was distinguished by the Court of
Appeals from those cases where the injury occurred at a
place where the injured person had a right to be. 7 By this
distinction it would appear that the doctrine can be applicable as a matter of law only when the injury occurred in
a place where the injured child was taken by the custodian
when they had no right to go or be there. In all other cases
the Court hints that the application of the doctrine under
proper instructions is one for the trier of fact. And the
burden of proof of these factual requirements is on the
defendant.
Even so imputed parental negligence is a doctrine which
is regarded by the great weight of authority as being unfair
Ibid, 127.
33Balto. City Pass. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534, 551 (1876) ; United Rys.
Co. v. Carneal, 110 Md. 211, 230, 72 A. 771 (1909).
Wash. B. & A. Elec. R. Co. v. :State, use of Kolish, supra,n. 28, 125.
Cumberland v. Lottig, 95 Md. 42, 51 A. 841 (1902).
Ibid, 48.

Wash. B. & A. Elec. R. Co. v. State, use of Kolish, 8upra, n. 28, 123.
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to an injured child and one which can easily be misapplied,
unless it is fully understood. If our Court will not overrule
its applicability, it might be well for the Legislature to consider a bar to its use, as has been done in two states which
are among those recognized as foremost in legal authority."s

VARYING TESTS FOR INSANITY
Salinger v.Superintendent of Spring Grove
State Hospital'

By MATmIs J. DEVrro*
In 1950, appellant was found insane at the time of committing alleged criminal offenses and insane at the time of2
trial, by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City.
The Court committed him to Spring Grove State Hospital
as authorized by statute.' In 1954, Salinger filed a petition
in Baltimore City requesting a jury to pass upon his sanity
pursuant to Article 59, Section 20.'
I

See &upra,n. 5.

* Third Year Student, University of Maryland School of Law.

2 112 A. 2d 907 (Md., 1955).
2 For an account of the circumstances surrounding Salinger's trial, see
DeVito, Insanity as a Defense - MeNaghten Rule Repudiated by District
of Columbia, 15 Md. L. Rev. 44, 50 (1955).
'Md. Code (1951), Art. 59, Sec. 7, provides:
"If the jury find by their verdict that such person was at the time of
committing the offense and then is insane or lunatic, the court
before which trial was had shall cause such person to be sent to the
almshouse of the county or city in which such person resided at the
time of the commission of such act, or to a hospital, or some other
place better suited in the judgment of the court to the condition of
such prisoner, there to be confined until he shall have recovered his
reason and be discharged by due course of law. .. "
'Md. Code (1955 Supp.), Art. 59, Sec. 20, provides:
"Any person confined in any State or licensed private institution for
the care, custody or treatment of insane persons, . . . may file a petition
in the law courts of any county or Baltimore City, . . ., requesting
that the person so confined be brought before said Court for the purpose of having the sanity of such person determined, and the Court
shall forthwith proceed to hear and determine the matter; . . . If the
Court or jury, as the case may be, shall determine that such person
is insane or is suffering from a mental disease, the Court shall order
said person committed to the institution from which he immediately
came, or to some other suitable institution, otherwie he shall be
discharged ...."
(This section was amended by the Laws of 1955, Ch. 352, to provide that
after a hearing has been held as outlined above, any further petition within
a year of the last hearing must be accompanied by affidavits of persons
other than himself showing the mental condition of the petitioner at the
time as compared with such condition at the time of the previous hearing.

